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ABSTRACT
Tags can be used by malware repositories and analysis services to
enable searches for samples of interest across different dimensions.
Automatically extracting tags fromAV labels is an efficient approach
to categorize and index massive amounts of samples. Recent tools
like AVclass and Euphony have demonstrated that, despite their
noisy nature, it is possible to extract family names from AV labels.
However, beyond the family name, AV labels contain much valuable
information such as malware classes, file properties, and behaviors.
This work presents AVclass2, an automatic malware tagging
tool that given the AV labels for a potentially massive number of
samples, extracts clean tags that categorize the samples. AVclass2
uses, and helps building, an open taxonomy that organizes concepts
in AV labels, but is not constrained to a predefined set of tags. To
keep itself updated as AV vendors introduce new tags, it provides
an update module that automatically identifies new taxonomy en-
tries, as well as tagging and expansion rules that capture relations
between tags. We have evaluated AVclass2 on 42M samples and
showed how it enables advanced malware searches and to maintain
an updated knowledge base of malware concepts in AV labels.
1 INTRODUCTION
Tags are keywords assigned to data objects (e.g., documents, videos,
images) to categorize them and to enable efficient searches along
different dimensions such as properties, ownership, and origin.
Tags can be used by malware repositories and malware analysis
services (e.g., [1, 2]) for enabling searches for samples of interest.
Malware tags can be manually produced by analysts, e.g., during
reverse engineering of a malware sample, or output by analysis
tools such as sandboxes and signature-matching engines. In both
cases, each analyst and tool developer may use its own vocabulary,
i.e., their own custom set of tags. This is similar to user tagging, or
folksonomies, in Web services [3, 4], which are known to lead to
issues such as tags produced by different entities being aliases (or
synonyms) for the same concept, some tags being highly specific
to the entity producing them, and a tag from an entity correspond-
ing to multiple tags from another entity. To address these issues,
standards such as Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characteri-
zation (MAEC) [5] define a language for sharing malware analysis
results. However, they have low adoption due to their use of rigid
controlled vocabularies (i.e., predefined tags) that may not always
match analyst needs, require frequent updates, and are necessarily
incomplete, e.g., MAEC does not include malware families.
Detection labels by anti-virus engines (i.e., AV labels) are an
instance of the above problem. An AV label can be seen as a se-
rialization of the set of tags an AV engine assigns to the sample.
Since tags are selected by each AV vendor rather independently, in-
consistencies among labels from different vendors are widespread,
as frequently observed in malware family names [6–11]. Recent
tools likeAVclass [10] and Euphony [11] demonstrate that, despite
their noisy nature, it is possible to extract accurate family tags from
AV labels. However, beyond the family name, AV labels may also
contain much valuable information such as the class of malware
(e.g., ransomware, downloader, adware), file properties (e.g., packed,
themida, bundle, nsis) and behaviors (e.g., spam, ddos, infosteal).
Automatically extracting malware tags from AV labels enables to
cheaply categorize and index massive amounts of samples without
waiting for those samples to be statically analyzed or executed in a
sandbox. And, since different AV vendors may execute a sample, the
extracted tags may accumulate behaviors observed under different
conditions. Furthermore, AV labels may encode domain knowledge
from human analysts that is not produced by automated tools. Once
obtained, the tags can be used to enable efficient search of samples
of a specific class, type, family, or with a specific behavior. And, the
identified samples can then be used as ground truth for machine
learning approaches [12–15].
Unfortunately, extracting useful tags from AV labels is challeng-
ing due to different vocabularies used by AV engines. For example,
Engine1 may include multiplug in its label for Sample1, while En-
gine2 includes brappware in its label for Sample2, which is not
detected by Engine1. Both tags refer to samples that modify the
browser by installing plugins. Thus, when an analyst searches for
behavior browsermodify, both samples should appear as results.
This work presents AVclass2, an automatic malware tagging
tool that given the AV labels for a potentially massive number of
samples, extracts for each input sample a clean set of tags that
capture properties such as the malware class, family, file properties,
and behaviors. AVclass2 ships with a default open taxonomy that
classifies concepts in AV labels into categories, as well as default
tagging rules and expansion rules that capture relations between
tags. In contrast to closed taxonomies, AVclass2 does not mandate
a predefined set of tags. Instead, unknown tags in AV labels, e.g., a
new behavior or family name, are also considered. AVclass2 has
an update module that uses tag co-occurrence to identify relations
between tags. Those relations are a form of generalized knowledge
that the update module uses to automatically generate taxonomy
updates, tagging, and expansion rules to keep the tool updated as
AV vendors introduce new tags. Thus, AVclass2 can maintain an
updated knowledge base of malware concepts in AV labels.
AVclass2 builds on AVclass [10]. The goal is to perform the
minimum needed changes to AVclass that allow it to evolve from a
malware labeling tool, focused exclusively on malware families, to a
malware tag extraction tool that provides rich threat intelligence by
extracting and structuring all useful information in AV labels. Thus,
AVClass2 inherits AVClass major properties: scalability, AV engine
independence, platform-agnostic, no access to samples required
(only to their labels), and open source.
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Figure 1: AVclass2 architecture.
We have evaluated AVclass2 on 42M samples and compared
it with AVclass and Euphony, the two state-of-the-art malware
family labeling tools. We show how the tags AVclass2 extract
enable rich searches on malware samples, not possibly with existing
tools, how the extracted tags are complementary to those already in
use by popular malware repositories such as VirusTotal [1], and how
the update module can be used to maintain an updated knowledge
base of malware concepts in AV labels.
The main properties of AVclass2 are:
• Automatically extracts tags from AV labels that catego-
rize malware samples along different dimensions such as
malware class, family, behaviors, and file properties.
• Uses and builds an open taxonomy that does not use a
closed set of tags, and thus can handle new tags introduced
over time by AV vendors.
• Can expand the input taxonomy, tagging rules, and expan-
sion rules, by generalizing relations found in AV labels,
allowing to maintain over time an up-to-date knowledge
base of malware concepts in AV labels.
• Evaluated on 42M samples and compared with the two
state-of-the-art malware family labeling tools [10, 11].
• Will be open-sourced upon publication.
2 OVERVIEW
When an AV engine flags a sample as malicious it returns an AV
label (or simply a label for short), i.e., a string with information
about the malicious sample. An AV label can be seen as a sequence
of tags separated by delimiters. Those tags are engine-specific as
they are selected rather independently by the AV vendor. For clarity,
we will use tokens to refer to engine-specific tags in AV labels and
tags to refer to entries in the taxonomy. Some tokens in AV labels
contain useful information such as the malware class (e.g., virus,
worm), malware family (e.g., zbot, virut), file properties (e.g., pdf,
toolbar), and behaviors usually retrieved dynamically (e.g., ddos,
proxy). Other tokens do not provide useful information because
they are generic (e.g., malicious, application) or very specific to
the AV vendor, and thus of little use for external analysts, such
as the detection technology (e.g., deepscan, cloud) or the specific
variant of a malware family (e.g., aghr, bcx). At a high level, the
goal of AVclass2 is to distinguish the tokens that provide useful
information, identify relations between tokens from different AV
engines, and convert them into tags in the taxonomy.
The architecture of AVclass2 is shown in Figure 1. It comprises
of two modules: labeling and update. The labeling module takes
as input the AV labels assigned by multiple AV engines to the
same samples, an optional list of AV engines whose labels to use
(if not provided, all AV labels are used), a set of tagging rules, an
optional set of expansion rules, and a taxonomy that classifies tags
into categories and captures parent-child relationships between
tags in the same category. For each input sample, it outputs a set
of tags ranked by the number of AV engines including the tag’s
concept in their label. AVclass2 ships with default tagging rules,
default expansion rules, and a default taxonomy. Thus, AVclass2
can be used out-of-the-box without the need for any configuration.
However, AVclass2 is fully configurable, so the analyst can easily
plug-in its own tagging rules, taxonomy, and expansion rules.
The update module takes as input the co-occurrence statistics,
tagging rules, expansion rules, and taxonomy. It first identifies
strong relations between tags, which generalize knowledge be-
yond individual samples, e.g., that a family is ransomware or sends
SMS. Then, it uses inference rules on the relations to automatically
propose new tagging rules, new expansion rules, and taxonomy
updates, which are then fed back to the labeling. The updated input
files serve as a knowledge base of concepts in AV labels.
The remainder of this section introduces the labeling module in
Section 2.1, describes the input taxonomy in Section 2.2, and finally
introduces the update module in Section 2.3.
2.1 Labeling Module Overview
The labeling module comprises of three steps: tokenization, tagging,
and expansion. We detail them next.
Tokenization. The first step is to split each label into a list of
tokens. The key property of the tokenization is that it aims to be
vendor-agnostic, i.e., it does not attempt to infer the structure of
the labels used by each AV vendor. The reasons for this design
decision are that the number of AV vendors is very large (e.g., over
a hundred AV engines have been used by VirusTotal over time),
that each vendor provides different information in their AV labels,
and that AV vendors are not very consistent in the format of their
labels, often modifying them over time. If we were to try to define,
or automatically infer, templates for each label format, we would
end up with hundreds of templates. This would make selecting the
right template for a label challenging. Worse, whenever a label was
observed using a previously unknown label format, tokenization
errors could be introduced.
Tagging. The main step in AVclass2 is replacing a token in an
AV label with a set of tags in the taxonomy. Such tagging converts
the unstructured information in the AV labels into well-defined
concepts in the taxonomy. It also identifies potentially useful tokens
not yet tagged. Tagging uses a set of input tagging rules that specify
the set of tags that a token will be replaced with, i.e., a tagging rule
maps an input token to an output set of tags. Most tagging rules
map a token to a single tag. For example, a tagging rule maps the
downldr token to the downloader tag. In this case, we say that that
the token is an alias for the tag, since it captures the same concept
as the tag. Multiple tokens may be aliases for the same tag. For
instance, another tagging rule maps the dloader token also to the
downloader tag. Thus, both tokens are downloader aliases. Similarly,
tokens finloski and fynloski are both aliases for the darkkomet family
tag. Aliases enable identifying when different vendors use different
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tokens to capture the same concept. A tagging rule may also define
that a token maps to multiple tags if the token captures multiple
concepts. For example, the token ircbot maps to tags irc and bot. It
is possible to define a tagging rule that maps a token to a tag that is
identical to the token. For example, the downloader token maps to
the downloader tag. However, there is no need to define such rules
as they are implicitly handled.
A tagging rule should map a token to the most specific tags
possible. For example, a tagging rule could map token addrop to
the adware tag, the grayware tag, or both of them. In this case, it
is best to map it to the adware tag because the default taxonomy,
detailed in Section 2.2, captures that adware is a child of grayware.
The expansion step below takes care of making explicit the implicit
relationships between tags in the taxonomy. Thus, there is no need
to assign the grayware tag explicitly at this point.
A tagging rule can also define that a token maps to an empty set
of tags. We call such tokens generic because they do not provide
useful information. Generic tokens are discarded during tagging.
Example generic tokens are malicious and application. It is impor-
tant to highlight that generic tokens in AVclass2 are different from
generic tokens in the original AVclass. In AVclass, a generic to-
ken provided no information about the family a sample belongs
to. In AVclass2, a generic token provides no useful information
at all (family or other). Thus, many tokens that were considered
generic by AVclass will be assigned tags by AVclass2, e.g., dldr
was a generic token in AVclass, but produces tag downloader in
AVclass2. In fact, generic tokens inAVclasswere the starting point
to build the seed taxonomy for AVclass2, described in Section 2.2.
When a token has not been seen before, it will not have a tagging
rule defined for it. In this case, the token should not be discarded
because it may still provide useful information, e.g., it may capture
a newly discovered family. Thus, unknown tokens are passed to
the expansion step.
Expansion. The expansion step uses expansion rules that define
that a tag implies a set of other tags, where the original tag is in-
cluded in the expanded set. For example, the worm class tag can be
expanded to include the selfpropagate behavior tag, since a worm
self-propagates by definition. Expansion rules allow to more accu-
rately capture how many AV engines capture the same concept in
their labels. For example, prior to expansion, AVclass2 may output
that the worm tag is assigned by two engines and selfpropagate
by another three. After expansion, AVclass2 can output that self-
propagate is assigned by five engines. More importantly, expansion
rules help increase search coverage. For example, if 95% of samples
with the virut family tag also have the virus class tag, the update
module will output an expansion rule from virut to virus. Using
that expansion rule, an extra 5% of virut samples will be added the
virus tag and thus will show up in searches for virus samples.
There exist two types of expansion rules: intra-category and
inter-category. Intra-category rules are implicitly defined by the
parent-child relationships in the input taxonomy. They capture that
a tag in one category implies other tags in the same category. For
instance, the taxonomy may define that the adware class tag is a
child of the grayware class tag. Thus, a sample tagged as adware
can also be tagged as grayware. Inter-category rules capture that a
tag from one category implies other tags from a different category.
Table 1: Summary of default taxonomy.
Category Tags Leaf Intermediate
BEH 43 38 infosteal, killproc, mining, sms
CLASS 34 27 bot, dialer, grayware, hoax, miner, virus,
worm
FAM 878 878 -
FILE 71 65 browserplugin, exploit, FILETYPE, iframe,
installer, OS, packed, PROGLANG
They make explicit otherwise implicit tag relationships, e.g., to add
the filemodify behavior to the virus class tag, as a virus by definition
modifies infected files, or to add the spam behavior to a bot family
known to send spam such as conficker. Both inter-category and
intra-category expansion rules can be automatically identified by
the update module. In addition, an analyst can provide AVclass2
with its own expansion rules based on domain knowledge.
2.2 Taxonomy
AVclass2 takes as input a taxonomy that defines parent-child re-
lationships between the tags used by the tagging rules. AVclass2
ships with a default taxonomy so that it can be used out-of-the-
box. The taxonomy supported by AVclass2 is structured as a tree.
The first level underneath the root comprises categories. Each cate-
gory forms its own subtree where nodes are tags and edges capture
parent-child relationships between tags. Intermediate tags are those
with at least one child, while leaf tags have no children. Figure 2
shows a simplified taxonomy with only a handful of tags under
each of the four default categories: behavior (BEH), class (CLASS),
file properties (FILE), and family (FAM). Some categories such as
FAM have no intermediate tags, they simply contain a set of tags
with no structure. Other categories contain intermediate tags that
capture parent-child relationships. For example, the CLASS cate-
gory contains intermediate tag grayware indicating that adware
and casino are classes of grayware. Some intermediate tags only
provide structure and are not useful for indexing. These appear
capitalized, e.g., OS.
By design, AVclass2 assumes that the input taxonomy is incom-
plete and will not contain all malware-related concepts, not even
all concepts that may appear in AV labels. We believe that building
a closed malware taxonomy that contains all malware-related con-
cepts is a futile effort, as it is nearly impossible to be complete and
malware continuously evolves, requiring constant updates to any
taxonomy. Instead, a key property of AVclass2 is that it supports
previously unknown concepts, not yet in the tagging rules and
taxonomy. When an unknown token, i.e., a token without a tagging
rule, appears in an AV label, AVclass2 will keep it and potentially
include it in the output, marking it as having an unknown (UNK)
pseudo-category. Another key property of AVclass2 is that the
taxonomy is provided as a separate input, so that it can be easily
modified. Thus, we say that AVclass2 uses an open taxonomy that
while incomplete, can be refined using the update module or in a
collaborative manner.
A tag can be represented by its name or by its path in the taxon-
omy up to the category it belongs to. For example, the adware tag
can also be represented as CLASS:grayware:adware.
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Figure 2: A simple taxonomy with all four categories in the default taxonomy, but only a small subset of its tags.
Default taxonomy. AVclass2 provides a default taxonomy, which
organizes concepts that commonly appear in AV labels. Since the
default taxonomy will be included in the open-source release of
AVclass2, users can share their updates collaboratively. The default
taxonomy is summarized in Table 1. It comprises of over 1,000 tags
split into the four categories in Figure 2, which we detail next.
• Behavior (BEH). Captures how the malware behaves, e.g.,
infosteal, sendssms, spam, mining. Behaviors manifest dur-
ing a sample’s execution, so dynamic analysis is needed to
retrieve them. However, once encoded in an AV label, they
can be extracted by AVclass2 without the need to execute
the sample.
• Class (CLASS). Malware classes are widely used to cap-
ture malware characteristics such as specific behaviors or
distribution methods. Common malware classes are worm,
virus, ransomware, and downloader. A malware family can
belong to multiple malware classes. For example,wannacry
was both ransomware and worm. A problematic class is tro-
jan. Originally, this class captured a distribution method,
namely that the sample fooled the user by claiming fake
functionality. However, nowadays trojan is the default class
used by AV vendors for samples without a more specific
class. Thus, we believe it currently holds little meaning and
should be considered generic. For this reason, AVclass2
by default considers trojan a generic token, but the analyst
can easily modify this behavior.
• File properties (FILE). Comprises of static file proper-
ties including the file type (e.g., pdf, flash, msword), the
operating system under which the sample executes (e.g.,
android, linux, windows), the packer used for obfuscation
(e.g., pecompact, themida, vmprotect), and the programming
language used to code the sample (e.g., autoit, delphi, java).
• Family (FAM). The malware family of the sample. The de-
fault taxonomy does not include parent-child relationships
between malware families, i.e., no intermediate family tags.
Family relationships could be added to the taxonomy using
malware lineage approaches [16, 17].
The starting point to build the default taxonomy was the file
with generic tokens in the AVclass repository. In AVclass, generics
were common tokens in AV labels that do not provide family infor-
mation. That differs from AVclass2 where generics are tokens that
do not provide any useful information, family or other. Our insight
was that the AVclass generics contained much useful non-family
information such as malware classes, behaviors, and file proper-
ties. To build the seed taxonomy, we examined AVclass generics,
manually classifying them into the four tag categories above, or
as generics that provide no useful information. After that initial
manual effort, we refined the seed taxonomy by running the update
module on different datasets, incorporating the newly found tags
and relationships, as well as adjusting any conflicts it identifies.
We believe that such refinement process could be done collabora-
tively by the community onceAVclass2 is publicly released. Table 1
summarizes the current status of the default taxonomy.
2.3 Update Module Overview
Malware is an ever-evolving ecosystem where new concepts keep
appearing. Over time, known families exhibit new behaviors and
file properties (e.g., novel obfuscations); new families are introduced
with their corresponding aliases; and novel malware classes are
occasionally created. Furthermore, new relations among known
concepts are learned by the community increasing our knowledge
base such as which families belong to a certain class or exhibit a
specific behavior. Keeping AVclass2 up-to-date with this natural
evolution is a challenge. It requires to constantly evolve the tax-
onomy, tagging rules, and expansion rules with new concepts and
previously unknown relations. Those new concepts will appear
in the output of AVclass2 as unknown tokens, not present in the
taxonomy and tagging rules. Manually categorizing those unknown
tokens does not scale to the huge numbers of new samples a secu-
rity vendor may observe each day. We need automatic approaches
to keep labeling and tagging tools up-to-date.
To this end, AVclass2 provides an update module to automati-
cally update the input taxonomy, tagging rules, and expansion rules
with new concepts and relations. The update module first identifies
co-occurrence relations of tokens in AV labels. Co-occurrence in
AV labels was introduced in VAMO [18] and later used in AVClass
and Euphony to identify family aliases. But, the update module in
AVclass2 takes this concept a step further by introducing a novel
recursive process that first identifies relations between unknown
tokens and tags and then uses a set of learning rules to classify
those relations and propose updates to the taxonomy, tagging rules,
and expansion rules.
3 LABELING MODULE
The labeling module takes as input the AV labels assigned by mul-
tiple AV engines to the same set of samples, an optional list of
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2.VIPRE "Trojan.Win32.CoinMiner.c"
3. Agnitum "Bebeg.RiskTool.BitCoinMiner!FwnP7UHRdLc"
4.AVG "Skodnab.BitCoinMiner.EQ"
(a) Input AV labels
2.VIPRE "trojan","win","coinminer","c"
3. Agnitum "bebeg","risktool","bitcoinminer"
4.AVG "skodna","bitcoinminer", "eq"
(b) After tokenization
2.VIPRE "windows","bitcoinminer"
3. Agnitum "bebeg","grayware","tool","bitcoinminer"
4.AVG "skodna","bitcoinminer"
(c) After tagging
"CLASS:miner:bitcoinminer","CLASS:miner",
"BEH:mining:bitcoinmining","BEH:mining"
2.VIPRE "FILE:os:windows",
"CLASS:miner:bitcoinminer","CLASS:miner",
"BEH:mining:bitcoinmining","BEH:mining"
3. Agnitum "FAM:bebeg",
"CLASS:grayware","CLASS:grayware:tool",
"CLASS:miner:bitcoinminer","CLASS:miner",
"BEH:mining:bitcoinmining","BEH:mining"
4.AVG "UNK:skodna",
"CLASS:miner:bitcoinminer","CLASS:miner",
"BEH:mining:bitcoinmining","BEH:mining"
(d) After expansion
CLASS:miner:bitcoinminer 3
CLASS:grayware 2
BEH:mining 6
BEH:mining:bitcoinmining 3
FAM:bebeg 2
(e) Output
Figure 3: Running example.
AV engines whose labels to use, a set of tagging rules, an optional
set of expansion rules, and a taxonomy. For each input sample, it
outputs a set of tags ranked by the number of AV engines including
the tag’s concept in their label. AVclass2 comprises of three steps:
tokenization, tagging, and expansion. To illustrate them we use the
running example in Figure 3. The inputs are the labels assigned by
four AV engines to the same sample, shown in Figure 3a.
Tokenization. Takes as input an AV label and outputs the list of
tokens the label contains. The tokenization in AVclass2 is almost
identical to that of AVclass and we refer the reader to the original
paper for details [10]. The only significant difference is that AV-
class2 does not filter out short tokens (less than four characters)
during tokenization, but rather after tagging. This enables AVclass
to extract tags from short tokens that correspond to well-known
concepts, e.g., dos, irc, bot. Figure 3b shows the tokens obtained in
our running example.
Tagging. Takes as input the tokens obtained from the tokenization
and the input tagging rules. For each input token, if a tagging rule
exists for the token, it applies it to obtain a list of tags. If the token
is generic, it is removed. If no tagging rule exists for the token, it is
kept. It outputs a list of identified tags and any remaining unknown
tokens. Figure 3c shows the tagging output. Some tokens have been
replaced by their tags, e.g., token win by tag windows and token
risktool by tags grayware and tool. Other tokens have been dropped
as generic (e.g., trojan) or because they are short (e.g., eq).
Expansion. Takes as input the file with expansion rules, the tax-
onomy, and the tags output by the tagging. For each tag, if an
expansion rule exists for it, it applies the rule to obtain a larger list
of target tags that replaces the tag. Unknown tokens are not affected
by the expansion. The expansion first applies the inter-category
expansion rules provided as input to AVclass2. Next, it applies
the implicit intra-category expansion rules due to the parent-child
tag relationships in the taxonomy. For example, in our running
example tag bitcoinminer implies tag CLASS:miner.
Output. For each tag and unknown token, AVclass2 counts the
number of AV labels where it appears. This count can be interpreted
as a confidence score. Tags and unknown tokens that appear in the
label of at most one AV engine are removed. This filters random
unknown tokens that earlier steps may have missed, as the likeli-
hood that those appear in labels from multiple AV engines is low,
as well as very low confidence tags.
The output of AVclass2 is the list of tags and unknown tokens
along with their confidence score. Figure 3e shows the output of
our running example where unknown token skodna, as well as tag
FILE:os:windows, have been removed because they only appeared
in one label. AVclass2 also provides a compatibility mode with
AVclass to output the most likely family for each sample, which
corresponds to the highest ranked family tag or unknown token.
i.e., FAM:bebeg in our running example.
4 UPDATE MODULE
The update process comprises of two steps. When labeling a dataset,
AVclass2 outputs co-occurrence statistics between tags and un-
known tokens. The larger the dataset, the higher confidence in the
identified co-occurrence statistics. The update module takes as in-
put the co-occurrence statistics, the taxonomy, and the tagging and
expansion rules. It performs two substeps: identifying strong rela-
tions and converting those relations into updates to the input files.
The process of generating co-occurrence statistics and identifying
strong relations is similar to the one used by AVclass to detect alias
relations [10]. The novel part of the update module is the recursive
process and update rules used to automatically generate updates to
the taxonomy, tagging rules, and expansion rules.
Co-occurrence statistics. The labeler obtains the co-occurrence
statistics after tagging and before expansion. For simplicity, in
this section we call tags to both tags and unknown tokens. We
call relation to each pair of tags that appear in labels for the same
sample and its co-occurrence statistics. For each relation, the labeler
outputs seven values: the tags ti , tj , the number of samples each
tag appears in the dataset being labeled |ti |, |tj |, the number of
samples where both tags appear |(ti , tj )|, and the fraction of times
that both tags appear in the same samples rel(ti , tj ) = |(ti ,tj ) ||ti |
and rel(tj , ti ) = |(ti ,tj ) ||tj | . The two tags are sorted so that tag ti is
the one that occurs less often, i.e., |ti | ≤ |tj |, which means that
rel(ti , tj ) ≥ rel(tj , ti ).
Identifying strong relations. Given the set of relations output
by the labeler, the update module first filters out weak relations.
A relation is strong if both tags have been seen in enough number
of samples and appear in the same samples frequently enough.
The first condition keeps only relations where min(|ti |,|tj |) ≥ n
where n is the minimum number of samples where a tag should
have been observed. The second condition keeps only relations
where rel(ti , tj ) ≥ T . Threshold T controls the minimum joint
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Table 2: Update module rules.
Cat(ti ) Cat(tj ) Rule
UNK FAM tagging(ti , tj , FAM)
UNK CLASS taxonomy(ti , FAM:ti )
UNK BEH taxonomy(ti , FAM:ti )
UNK FILE taxonomy(ti , path(tj ):ti )
UNK UNK taxonomy(ti , FAM); taxonomy(tj , FAM)
FAM UNK tagging(ti , tj , FAM)
FILE UNK tagging(ti , tj , prefix(ti ))
FAM FAM tagging(ti , tj , prefix(tj ))
FAM FILE expansion(ti , tj )
FAM BEH expansion(ti , tj )
FAM CLASS expansion(ti , tj )
CLASS FILE expansion(ti , tj )
CLASS BEH expansion(ti , tj )
frequency to determine a relation is strong. For strong relations, we
say that ti implies tj , ti ⇒ tj , but tj may not imply ti . For example,
if family tag virut appears in 1M samples and class tag virus in
7M samples, and in every sample virut appears virus also appears
(rel(virut ,virus) = 1.0), then virut⇒ virus, but virus⇏ virut as
there are 6M instances were virus is observed without virut, likely
corresponding to other virus families (rel(virus,virut) = 0.14). If
both rel(ti , tj ) ≥ T and rel(tj , ti ) ≥ T we say the tags are equivalent,
ti ⇔ tj . Parameters n and T were empirically selected in AVclass
and we use their suggested default values of n = 20 and T = 0.94.
Weak relations and relations including a OS tag are removed.
The latter avoids that an expansion rule is created for each family
towards its platform, e.g., virut⇒windows, droidkungfu⇒ android.
Updates to taxonomy and tagging. The updatemodule performs
a recursive process where each iteration examines the set of remain-
ing relations. The process starts with the identified strong relations.
At each iteration, every remaining relation is checked against a
set of rules to identify updates to the current taxonomy, tagging,
and expansion rules. Processed relations are removed, the rest are
kept. Once all relations are examined, the process runs into a new
iteration with the remaining relations. Recursion ends when one
iteration does not produce any updates or no relations remain.
Each relation is first checked to see if it is already known. A
relation is known if it is already captured in the current taxonomy,
tagging rules, or expansion rules. For example, adware⇒ grayware
is implicit in the default taxonomy. This check happens before each
relation is processed because the taxonomy, tagging, and expansion
rules change as relations are processed and a relation that was not
known before may become known once other relations have been
processed. Known relations are removed. If not known, and the tags
are equivalent, a tagging rule is added from ti to tj since ti is the
least common of the two tags. If not an equivalence, the relation is
processed according to the rules in the top block of Table 2, which
are indexed by the categories of the two tags. UNK is a pseudo-
category for unknown tags not in the taxonomy (i.e., unknown
tokens). All rules, but the last one, handle relations where at least
one tag is unknown. These rules create a tagging rule between the
two tags or add the unknown tag to the taxonomy with a path
prefix indicated by the rule. by the rule. For example, the top rule
captures that an unknown tag implies a family tag, which creates a
Table 3: Datasets used in evaluation.
Dataset Plat. GT Samples Bin. Collection
Superset Mix ✗ 42,533,619 ✗ 08/2008 - 05/2019
Lever et al. [19] Win ✗ 37,817,328 ✗ 01/2011 - 08/2015
Andropup And ✗ 3,145,283 ✗ 05/2019 - 09/2019
Miller et al. [20] Win ✗ 1,079,783 ✗ 01/2012 - 06/2014
Andrubis [21] And ✗ 422,826 ✗ 06/2012 - 06/2014
Malsign [22] Win ✓ 142,500 ✗ 06/2012 - 02/2015
AMD [23] And ✓ 24,553 ✓ 11/2010 - 03/2016
Malicia [24] Win ✓ 9,908 ✓ 03/2012 - 02/2013
Drebin [15] And ✓ 5,560 ✓ 08/2010 - 10/2012
Malheur [14] Win ✓ 3,131 ✗ 08/2009 - 08/2009
MalGenome [25] And ✓ 1,260 ✓ 08/2008 - 10/2010
tagging rule capturing that the unknown tag ti is an alias for the
family tag tj . Adding a tagging rule ti ⇒ tj forces ti to be removed
from the taxonomy (if present) and tj to be added (if it did not
exist). The last rule in the block creates a tagging rule for a relation
between family tags indicating that ti is an alias for tj and thus ti
does not need to be in the taxonomy.
Updates to expansions. Since expansions happen between two
tags in the taxonomy it is more efficient to identify them once all
rules for unknown tags have been applied and the taxonomy and
tagging rules are stable. Once the recursion ends, all remaining
rules are examined using the expansion rules in the bottom block
of Table 2. The expansion rules capture properties of a family such
as its class, file properties or behaviors, as well as a class having
specific behaviors or file properties (e.g., using a exploit).
The five categories (including UNK), create 25 distinct category
pairs. However, only 13 pairs are considered in Table 2. There
exist 12 category pairs without a rule. Our evaluation will show
that those pairs constitute less than 1% of relations and when they
happen they indicate some collision that we believe is best resolved
manually by an analyst.
Once the process finishes the update module outputs the up-
dated taxonomy, tagging and expansion rules. Most updates will
be additional tags in the taxonomy and new tagging and expansion
rules, but it is possible that some original taxonomy entries and
tagging rules have been modified or removed.
5 EVALUATION
This section evaluates AVclass2. First, Section 5.1 presents the
datasets used. Then, Section 5.2 details the tagging results. Next,
Section 5.3 demonstrates the update module. Section 5.4 illustrates
the benefits of AVclass2. Finally, Section 5.5 compares AVclass2
with prior family tagging tools AVclass and Euphony.
5.1 Datasets
We evaluate AVclass2 using the 11 datasets in Table 3. For each
dataset, the table shows the target architecture of the samples (Win-
dows, Android, or both), whether the samples are labeled with a
family name, the number of samples, whether binaries are available
(otherwise we only have their hashes), and the collection period.
Most datasets come from prior works, save for Andropup that con-
tains recent Android malware and PUP, and Superset that is the
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Table 4: Percentage of samples for which a tag could be ex-
tracted, as well as percentage of tagged samples with a tag
from each category.
Tagged
Dataset All VT≥4 FILE CLA BEH FAM UNK
Superset 97% 100% 99% 94% 75% 83% 13%
Lever 98% 100% 99% 94% 78% 83% 13%
Andropup 89% 99% 98% 95% 28% 74% 16%
Miller 95% 99% 100% 91% 82% 82% 20%
Andrubis 100% 100% 100% 89% 69% 98% 4%
Malsign 99% 99% 97% 95% 73% 96% 5%
AMD 100% 100% 100% 99% 31% 98% 14%
Malicia 100% 100% 100% 89% 85% 97% 12%
Drebin 100% 100% 100% 92% 71% 98% 5%
Malheur 100% 100% 100% 93% 83% 66% 7%
MalGen. 100% 100% 100% 96% 82% 98% 2%
union of all other datasets. Some datasets overlap, e.g., Drebin [15]
is a superset of MalGenome [25]. We do not remove duplicates to
make it easy to map results to publicly available datasets.
We had VT reports for most samples and only collect a few
missing ones. We use the available reports since VT’s rate limits
makes it infeasible for us to collect the latest reports.
5.2 Tagging Evaluation
Table 4 summarizes the tagging coverage of AVclass2, i.e., the
fraction of samples for which it can extract a tag. These results are
obtained using the tagging rules, expansion rules, and taxonomy
output by the update module after it identifies previously unknown
relations. In Section 5.3 we analyze the tagging improvement before
and after applying the update module. The table first shows the
fraction of all samples, and those flagged by at least four AV engines
(a threshold used to remove potentially benign samples), for which
at least one tag was obtained. Then, for each category, it shows the
fraction of tagged samples with at least four detections with a tag
of that category. Column UNK corresponds to samples with at least
one output unknown token not in the taxonomy.
The results show that AVclass2 can extract at least one tag for
89%–100% of the samples, depending on the dataset. Thus, it is
possible to index the majority of samples. The files for which no
tags can be extracted largely correspond to those with very few
detections, which is higher for Andropup as it is the most recent
dataset. When considering only clearly malicious files (VT ≥ 4) the
fraction of tagged samples is at least 99%. As shown by the Superset,
the most common tags are file properties (99% of samples), followed
by malware classes (94%), known families (83%), and behaviors
(75%). It is important to note that the FAM column considers only
samples tagged with families that appear in the taxonomy. However,
unknown tags most often correspond to new families that have
not yet been added to the taxonomy and should be considered for
final family tagging results. Section 5.5 compares the family tagging
results of AVclass2 to prior tools like AVclass and Euphony.
Most popular tags. Table 5 shows the top 10 tags in the Superset
for each category, ranked by the number of samples assigned the tag.
The most popular tag is FILE:OS:windows (61% of samples), followed
by CLASS:grayware (46%), BEH:execdownload (27%), BEH:filemodify
(21%), FILE:packed (20%), and CLASS:downloader (20%). Our taxon-
omy contains 34–71 tags in each of the non-family categories, and
878 families. Of the tags in the taxonomy 94%–100%, depending
on the category, appear in the Superset. Thus, the distribution of
tags per category contains a large number of tags with at most
1% coverage, each identifying up to tens of thousands of samples.
Thus, AVclass2 extracts a wide variety of tags that can be used
by the analyst to search for samples according to class, family, file
properties, and behaviors.
The top FILE tags include the platform (windows, android), whether
the sample is packed, if it is a bundle that contains other executables,
the programming language (autoit,msil for C#), if it is an installer or
has been generated by a particular installer (nsis), the size of the file
(small), and whether it contains html files. Intermediate tags rank
high because they accumulate popularity of their children through
the expansion on taxonomy relationships. For example, packed ac-
cumulates the influence of all packer tags in the taxonomy (e.g.,
asroot, upack, themida). And, installer the influence of nsis, as well as
other installer-generating software (e.g., wiseinstaller, installmate).
There are four CLASS tags appearing in more than 10% of the
samples. They capture the popularity of potentially unwanted
programs, downloaders, monetizing through advertisements, and
viruses. CLASS:grayware:adware:multiplug are adware that install
browser plugins (e.g., extensions, toolbars) to modify the user’s
Web surfing. And, CLASS:grayware:tool are tools not necessarily
malicious, but often abused, such as those used for remote adminis-
tration. Note that trojan is considered generic, otherwise it would
be assigned to 86% of the samples.
The top three behavior tags correspond to expansions from
class tags: downloader⇒ execdownload, virus⇒filemodify, worm
⇒ selfpropagate. Note that the behavior associated to a class gets
a higher tagging ratio than its class, indicating additional samples
without the corresponding class tag. For example, execdownload
has an additional 7% samples without the downloader class tag and
filemodify an additional 6% over virus. Other popular behaviors
are autorun, which captures samples that modify the autorun.inf
Windows file to automatically execute; those related to obfuscation
such as injecting code in a benign process and killing a process, typ-
ically of a security tool; opening a server, alerting the user, sending
SMS messages; and launching denial of service attacks.
Top families have lower prevalence than top classes, file proper-
ties, and behaviors. The most prevalent family is vobfus (10%). Out
of the top families, half correspond to grayware families (loadmoney,
softpulse, installererex, domaiq, firseria) and the rest are malware.
Top unknown tokens have much lower prevalence, at most 1%.
They mostly correspond to families not yet in the taxonomy, for
which no strong relation has yet been observed to another tag.
5.3 Update Module
We illustrate the usage of the update module with the Andropup
dataset. When we first obtained this dataset, we run AVclass2’s
labeler observing that 65% of samples contained an unknown tag.
To reduce this number we run the update module on the current
taxonomy and without any expansion rules. The output taxonomy
entries, tagging rules, and expansion rules lead to a reduction from
65% to the 16% of samples with an unknown tag in Table 4.
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Table 5: Top 10 tags for each category ranked by the number of samples assigned the tag in the Superset dataset.
Rank FILE CLASS BEH FAM UNK
1 windows 61% grayware 46% execdownload 27% vobfus 10% fraudpack 1%
2 packed 20% downloader 20% filemodify 21% loadmoney 5% atraps 1%
3 android 5% adware 18% selfpropagate 12% virut 5% hiddapp 1%
4 bundle 3% virus 15% autorun 10% softpulse 4% hiddenads 1%
5 installer 2% worm 9% inject 6% installerex 3% packer 1%
6 small 2% backdoor 4% server 6% domaiq 3% llac 1%
7 nsis 1% multiplug 4% alertuser 2% firseria 3% trymedia 1%
8 msil 1% rogueware 2% killproc 2% zbot 3% refroso 1%
9 autoit 1% tool 1% sms 2% sality 3% bifrost 1%
10 html 1% clicker 1% ddos 2% virlock 2% comame 1%
Table 6: Update module evaluation results with n = 20 and T = 0.94.
Relations Taxonomy Entries Tagging Rules Expansion Rules
Dataset All Strong Out Added Rem. Added Rem. Added Rem.
Andropup 30,107 968 3 486 2 216 10 461 0
Table 6 summarizes the update module results. Since we only
have ground truth for families, which is similar to the ones used
in AVclass, we use the default values suggested in that work of
n = 20 and T = 0.94 [10]. The co-occurrence statistics output by
the labeler contain 30,107 relations, of which 968 are strong. Those
968 relations belong to 11 category pairs, the most popular being
UNK⇒CLASS (61%), UNK⇒UNK (17%), UNK⇒BEH (9%), UNK
⇒ FAM (7%), FAM⇒CLASS (2%), and UNK⇒ FILE (2%). The other
five category pairs had at most 0.3% relations each. Overall, 96% of
the strong relations involve an unknown token.
From those 968 strong relations, the update module automati-
cally identified 486 new taxonomy entries, 216 new tagging rules,
and 461 expansion rules. Of the new taxonomy entries, 97% cor-
respond to new families. The other 3% are file properties, mostly
Android exploits, e.g., FILE:exploit:asroot, FILE:exploit:exploid, and
FILE:exploit:gingerbreak. The new expansion rules link families to
their class or behavior. The most popular destination tags are: gray-
ware (46%), adware (26%), infosteal (8%), and downloader (6%).
At the end of the update module processing, there remain only
three strong relations (0.3%) for which no updates are generated
because they lack a processing rule. For these relations the analyst
would have to manually decide how to handle them. The first is
FILE:patch⇒CLASS:grayware. This is an example of an homonym,
i.e., a token with two possible meanings. In our seed taxonomy, ob-
tained from the AVclass generics, we manually (incorrectly) classi-
fied patch as a file type. But, this relation automatically extracted by
the update module allowed us to understand that the tag is used for
modding apps (e.g., Lucky Patcher1) that patch other apps for unlim-
ited access, no ads, etc. This allowed us to correct our error making
patch an alias for BEH:filemodify. Another homonymwe incorrectly
classified in our seed taxonomy is fakedoc, which we though meant
a fake document, but the update module identified that battery-
doctor⇒ FILE:fakedoc, indicating fakedoc is instead a rogueware
family (fakedoctor). The other two unhandled relations are due to
over-fitting of a particular family. Relation FILE:proglang:powershell
1https://www.luckypatchers.com/
⇒CLASS:keylogger is due to a keylogging family that uses Pow-
ershell scripts and relation BEH:inject ⇒CLASS:downloader to a
downloader family that injects in other processes. Since they are
not general enough, we ignore both relations.
Update quality. To evaluate the quality of the generated updates,
we manually examine the resulting taxonomy, tagging, and expan-
sion rules looking for errors based on our domain knowledge and
Web searches. We acknowledge that this process is subjective and
we may not be able to spot all errors, but we do not know how to ob-
tain a better ground truth. We identify 11 cases were we would have
done things differently than the update module. First, five family
tags should likely be classes/subclasses (bankbot, clickfraud, fakean-
tivirus, locker, remoteadmin). In addition, trojandldr was marked
as a family tag with an expansion rule trojandldr ⇒ downloader,
but making the expansion rule a tagging rule would have been
cleaner. One challenge is distinguishing the name of an exploit
(file property) from a family that uses an exploit. In most cases the
update module is correct, but FILE:exploit:rootmaster should likely
be FAM:rootmaster with an expansion rule rootmaster ⇒ exploit.
There is also one tagging rule cryptominer⇒ coinhive where cryp-
tominer should likely be an alias for CLASS:miner. One new file
property in the taxonomy FILE:proglang:java:genericgba is likely
a generic token. And, another file property FILE:packed:decrypter
does not look like any known packer, so we are not sure what it
exactly represents. Finally, FILE:testvirus:testfile would be better as
a tagging rule testfile⇒ testvirus.
In summary, out of 1,163 updates to the taxonomy and rules,
only 11 (0.9%) required adjustments. Additionally, three relations
had to be checked, allowing us to correct errors with homonyms
introduced in the manual creation of the seed taxonomy.
5.4 Beyond Family Labeling
The main benefits of AVclass2 over prior family labeling tools are
that it enables tag-based searches beyond families, and it builds
malware knowledge generalizing beyond individual samples.
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Search. The tags output by AVclass2 enable advanced searches
on a malware repository. The 975 tags identified in the Superset,
can be used, among others, to identify samples that are grayware,
belong to a specific class (e.g., ransomware, information stealers),
send SMS, launch DoS attacks, use a specific packer (e.g., themida,
asroot), or installer software (e.g., nsis,wiseinstaller) software. Those
samples can then be used to build classifiers.
We examine how the extracted tags compare with those already
used by VirusTotal. The VT documentation mentions 337 tags,
mostly corresponding to file properties and behaviors [26]. Those
337 tags do not include family names or classes (save for worm and
emailworm). Of those 337 tags, we observe 259 in the reports of
samples in the Superset. Of those VT tags, only 36 are identical to
tags in our default taxonomywith the largest types being 15 packers,
4 programming languages, and 4 file types. Thus, the tags output by
AVclass2 nicely complement the ones already in use by VT. Since
AVclass2 already operates on VT reports, adding AVclass2’s tags
to VT would be straightforward and would enable new searches not
currently possible such as those for samples of a particular malware
class or family, as well as searches for a richer set of file properties
and behaviors. This highlights the benefit of AVclass2’s automatic
tag extraction to popular malware repositories.
Knowledge base. AVclass2 taxonomy, tagging rules, and expan-
sion rules form a malware knowledge base that capture relations
beyond individual samples such as which families are ransomware
or information stealers. Compared to existing online malware en-
cyclopedias, its contents have been obtained using a well-defined
methodology; are not specific to one vendor; and since they will
be publicly available, can be discussed and evolved collaboratively.
Furthermore, AVclass2’s update module allows to refine the knowl-
edge base over time keeping it up-to-date.
5.5 Family Labeling Comparison
This section compares AVclass2 with AVclass and Euphony for
family labeling. The goal is not to evaluate AVclass2 for family
labeling, as an analyst that only requires family labeling, but not
the additional malware and threat intelligence AVclass2 provides,
does not need to use AVclass2, as it does not significantly differ
from AVclass for that task. Instead, the comparison allow us to (1)
evaluate AVclass versus Euphony (not done in the original works),
(2) highlight the importance of the update module, and (3) show
our vision for using AVclass2 and AVclass.
For the comparison, we use the most recent versions of Euphony
and AVclass at the time of writing. and the Windows and Android
datasets with ground truth. While Euphony was only evaluated
on labels of Android samples, its processing is equally valid for
Windows. For AVclass2, we use its AVclass compatibility option,
which selects as the sample’s family the highest ranked family tag
or unknown token. For AVclass, we use the most recent aliases and
generics in its repository. However, AVclass2 has the advantage of
using taxonomy and tagging rules identified by the update module
on larger datasets than AVclass was evaluated on. To make the
comparisonmore fair, we have createdAVclass*, a modified version
of AVclass that takes as input the taxonomy and tagging rules from
AVclass2, extracts from those files the list of aliases and generics
AVclass needs, and ignores the additional information. This enables
comparing AVclass2 and AVclass on the same input knowledge.
Results of the four tools, run on the same server, are in Table 7.
For each tool and dataset it shows the runtime in seconds, the
percentage of samples with a family, and the accuracy (precision,
recall, F1 score) when the results are compared with the available
ground truth. Given that these are old datasets with large average
number of detections per sample, all tools output a label for almost
all samples. AVclass2 and AVclass* achieve the highest F1 score
on four of the five datasets, while AVclass ranks first on Malheur.
Euphony’s accuracy drops significantly on the larger datasets from
89%-91% on Malheur and Drebin down to 59%-73% on Malsign,
Malicia, and AMD. AVclass2 and AVclass do not show such drop.
AVclass is the fastest, followed by AVclass2, with Euphony being
from 7 to 34 times slower than AVclass. Furthermore, we tested
Euphony on the larger datasets without ground truth and for those
larger than 1M samples, it did not terminate in 48 hours or crashed
with an out of memory exception (on a server with 126 GB RAM).
In summary, AVclass is more accurate and 7x–34x faster than
Euphony, which does not scale to large datasets. AVclass* and
AVclass2 have the same accuracy, but AVclass2 is slower due to
the extra processing to extract more tags. Thus, there is no reason
to use AVclass2 over AVclass for family labeling, as long as both
tools use the same input knowledge. Without providing updated
data files to AVclass, AVclass2 would outperform it, despite the
family labeling functionality being identical. This highlights the
importance of the update module.
An analyst that requires advanced searches or the extra intelli-
gence should use AVclass2, but those that exclusively need family
labels could still use the faster AVclass. Our vision is that both
AVclass2 and AVclass should take as input the same data files,
avoiding duplicate work to keep both tools up-to-date. For this, we
will contribute our AVclass* modifications to AVclass, so that both
tools take as input the same files. This will enable the community
to collaboratively update the malware knowledge in the taxonomy,
tagging rules, and expansion rules, without affecting backwards
compatibility or diverting resources for duplicated tasks.
6 RELATEDWORK
AV labels have been widely studied for over a decade. Early works
showed the problem of different AV engines disagreeing on labels
for the same sample [6, 7]. Despite this problem, AV labels have
been widely used to build training datasets and evaluate malware
detection and clustering approaches [6, 8, 12–15, 20, 22, 27–31]. Li et
al. [32] studied AV labels as a reference to evaluate clustering results.
They showed that including only a subset of samples, for which AV
engines largely agree, biases the evaluation towards samples that
are easier to label. Other works have focused on the quality of the
labels from different AV engines. Mohaisen and Alrawi [9] proposed
metrics for evaluating AV labels, identifying clusters of AV engines
that copy their labels [9]; Kantchelian et al. [33] discussed that AV
engines have varying label quality and proposed they should be
weighted differently; and Hurier et al. [34] proposed metrics to
evaluate ground truth datasets built using AV labels.
The dynamics of AV labels have been another target of analysis.
Some works have shown how AV engines change their labels for
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Table 7: Family labeling comparison between AVclass2, AVclass, and Euphony on datasets with ground truth. T is in seconds.
AVclass2 AVclass * AVclass Euphony
Dataset T Fam Prec Rec F1 T Fam Prec Rec F1 T Fam Prec Rec F1 T Fam Prec Rec F1
Malsign 205 99% 91% 92% 92% 139 99% 91% 92% 92% 139 100% 90% 90% 90% 2,126 97% 74% 49% 59%
AMD 44 100% 92% 80% 86% 50 100% 92% 80% 86% 50 100% 92% 76% 83% 331 100% 76% 70% 73%
Malicia 20 100% 95% 60% 74% 14 100% 95% 60% 74% 14 100% 95% 61% 74% 593 100% 86% 54% 67%
Malheur 2 100% 91% 94% 92% 1 100% 91% 94% 92% 1 100% 91% 98% 94% 53 100% 90% 93% 91%
Drebin 5 100% 94% 96% 95% 8 100% 94% 96% 95% 8 100% 96% 89% 92% 208 100% 94% 85% 89%
the same samples over time as a result of signatures and analysis
being refined [33, 35] and that detection systems should be trained
with the labels available at training, not testing, time [20]. Recently,
Zhu et al. [36] analyze daily snapshots of 14K samples over a year.
Among other results, they confirm that certain sets of AV engines
produce strongly correlated labels, as observed in AVMeter [9] and
implemented in AVClass [10], and show that hand-picking of a few
trusted engines does not always perform well.
Malware labeling. One approach to tackle disagreements on mal-
ware names is to use naming conventions such as the 1991 CARO
Virus Naming Convention [37]. Another attempt was the Com-
mon Malware Enumeration (CME) Initiative [38] that provided
unique identifiers for malware. Unfortunately, conventions have
not achieved wide adoption, possibly due to their use of predefined
tags, i.e., controlled vocabularies, that are incomplete and require
frequent updates.
An alternative approach is to automatically extract accurate fam-
ily names from AV labels. A precursor of this was VAMO [18] that
proposed an automated approach for evaluating clustering results
by building a graph of the normalized labels of 4 AV engines. It in-
troduced the use of label co-occurrence, i.e., the fraction of samples
where labels, possibly from different engines, appear together.
Tools like AVclass [10] and Euphony [11] have demonstrated
that it is possible to extract accurate family tags from AV labels.
One key idea of these works is to avoid using the whole label as
family name, as AV labels encode other non-family information.
AVclass and Euphony take as input AV labels for a large number of
samples, and output a family name for each sample. They both use
co-occurrence to automatically identify family aliases. However,
there are some key differences between them. AVclass proposes
that aliases and generic tokens learned from one dataset can be
reused on other datasets. Instead, Euphony uses a graph-based
approach that identifies aliases within the dataset, but does not
produce relations that can be reused. In addition, AVclass avoids
predicting which AV engines are better at labeling samples. Instead,
it makes the tokenization as AV engine independent as possible.
Instead, Euphony tries to learn the structure of the labels from
a selected subset of AV engines. As shown in Section 5.5, these
differences result in improved accuracy and scalability for AVclass,
a key reason why we decided to build AVclass2 on top of AVclass.
Compared to prior malware labeling tools, AVclass2 leverages
that AV labels contain a wealth of information beyond family names
such as malware classes, file properties, and behaviors. Such infor-
mation is not extracted by tools like AVclass and Euphony and can
be used to produce tags to categorize and index malware samples.
Malware tagging. The use of tags to characterize malware is at
the heart of information sharing standards like Malware Attribute
Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC) [5] and Malware Infor-
mation Sharing Platform (MISP) [39]. In addition, tags are already
used by some malware repositories to enable efficient search. To
further the use of malware tags, we present AVclass2, an automatic
tool to extract tags from the wealth of information on AV labels. The
generated tags can be incorporated by those repositories to enable
richer searches. Most related to our work is simultaneous work by
Ducau et al. [40] that extract 11 pre-defined tags, mostly malware
classes, from the AV labels of 10 AV engines. They use the tags as
training set for a classifier that predicts the tags in new samples.
Some key differences of AVclass2 are that it does not pre-define the
tags, instead building an open taxonomy (which currently has 150
non-family tags), handles tag aliasing (e.g., downloader and dropper
are aliases in our taxonomy), provides support for updating the
input rules and taxonomy, does not limit the supported AV engines,
and will be open-sourced.
7 CONCLUSION
Automatically extracting tags fromAV labels is an efficient approach
to categorize and indexmassive amounts of malware samples. But, it
is challenging due to the different vocabularies used by AV engines.
In this work, we have presented AVclass2, an automatic malware
tagging tool that given the AV labels for a potentially massive
number of samples, extracts clean tags that categorize the samples
according to different dimensions such as malware class, family,
file properties, and behaviors. The extracted tags can be used by
malware repositories and analysis services to enable, or enhance,
searches for samples of interest. Those samples, can in turn be
used as ground truth for machine learning approaches. AVclass2
uses, and helps building, an open taxonomy that organizes concepts
in AV labels, but is not constrained to a predefined set of tags.
AVclass2 provides an update module that uses tag co-occurrence
to automatically identify taxonomy updates, as well as tagging
and expansion rules that capture relations between tags. Thus,
it can be easily updated as AV vendors introduce new tags. We
have evaluated AVclass2 on 42M samples. AVclass2 will be open-
sourced upon publication.
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